FanPost

Bad Batteries - The Real Yankee Power Failure

Until first pitch on Saturday night, everyone with two cents in baseball will be talking about how the Red Sox were able to beat the Yankees to advance to the ALCS and face the defending champs for a chance at the World Series. This wasn’t expected. In spite of the Red Sox’ dominant regular season, the airwaves this past week were dominated by talk of a questionable Red Sox pitching staff and an inevitable Yankees’ victory. The Bombers would bomb, David Price would choke, the Sox bullpen would fail to build a bridge to Kimbrel, and the Yankees would advance. Only one of those predictions was on point. The Sox are moving on.


Baseball writers will talk about Chris Sale’s timely uptick in velocity and Giancarlo Stanton’s untimely power failure. About Brock Holt’s unprecedented postseason cycle and Nate Eovaldi’s surprising dominance (though it really wasn’t surprising at all). About the bottom of the Red Sox order hitting like the MVP candidates at the top and the Yankees’ over reliance on the long ball. About Manager Alex Cora’s inspired lineup manipulation and Manager Aaron Boone’s odd decision to play Neil Walker in Game 4. They will talk about Luis Severino’s strangely shortened warmup before Game 3 and… Well, they will talk about everything under the sun, but this writer wants to talk about one thing - catching.


Catching was the single most important element in this series. Not because Red Sox catcher Christian Vazquez homered in Game 4 and Yankees catcher Gary Sanchez did not, but because Vazquez is truly a catcher and Sanchez is not. Because Sandy Leon is a catcher and Sanchez is not.


Yes, Sanchez drove in five of the Yankees’ 14 runs (36% of their run production), but Sanchez should have been doing so as DH, not catcher. And frankly, Stanton should have been in the outfield (Andrew McCutchen’s arm has no business in left field - or, sadly, anywhere anymore). Sanchez can hit bombs, and nothing else it seems, and a smarter manager than Aaron Boone, or a smarter GM than Brian Cashman, or a better analytics staff in the Yankees’ front office would have identified this actuality long before it came into play in the ALDS.


This is not to say that the Red Sox front office is infallible in this regard - their insistent development of Blake Swihart as a catcher who can hit better than either Leon or Vazquez is a mistake - but it is to say that, at the very least, the Yankees have not valued catching to the same extent as the Sox. And it is to recognize that the Sox, in spite of developing Swihart as a catcher to their detriment (and probably to his), chose to start their two best catchers - DEFENSIVE catchers - in the postseason. The Yankees went the other direction, favoring a Mendoza-line batting average and power potential over sound defense, and their decision to start Sanchez over Austin Romine was no more critical to the game’s outcome in any game than it was to Game 3’s.


Ironic is the best word to describe how Austin Romine entered Game Three of the ALDS. The Yankees’ beat catcher didn’t start at catcher, and he didn’t finish there either, but he did play. Romine pitched. By the time Romine entered in the 9th inning, the game had long been a laugher, so Romine was brought in to save an inning of bullpen usage for the remainder of the series. And this writer would suggest to you that the game may very well have not been a laugher at all if Romine had started at catcher - if the Yankees had favored defense over offense at premium defensive positions (catcher, second base, shortstop, center field).


Consider how Game 3 began. In the 1st inning, one runner - JD Martinez - reached base. Severino walked him. No big deal, you might argue. But realize that this was the first of eight walks issued by Yankee pitching. Six pitchers combined to walk eight. This is not indicative of a walk-prone pitching staff. Nor does it suggest the Sox batters are THAT good at working walks. What it does reflect is the fact that Sanchez often can’t even physically catch the ball delivered by the pitcher.


This has two notable effects on the outcome of a given at bat. First, when a catcher can’t catch the ball, umpires often won’t call a strike - even when the pitch crosses the strike zone. And batters, knowing this, are less likely to swing at borderline pitches. This means deeper counts. With a guy like Sanchez behind the plate, every pitcher he works with may end up throwing more pitches in more hitter’s counts than they otherwise would. More pitches means more pitcher fatigue, more mistakes, and more runs allowed. More hitter’s counts means more hits, more extra-base hits, and more runs scored. It’s simple math - catching matters.


In the 2nd inning, the Red Sox scored their first run - the first of 16. Yes, they ended up scoring 16, but remember this - the first run is the hardest. So, how did they get this first, difficult run? Rafael Devers stole second on a dropped pitch by Sanchez. Romine probably would’ve thrown him out. An actual catcher of any name would probably have thrown him out. A groundout and a single later, and the Sox are on the board. The Red Sox are ahead; the Yankees are behind. If you’ve ever played the game, you know how this affects your in-game, moment-to-moment psychology. If you’re not very experienced and exceptionally careful, this imbalance in the score can start to affect everything you do. Mainly, it can cause players to press, at the plate, on the mound, and in the field. Pressing means losing… and losing means pressing.


Tangential note… The second run the Sox scored wasn’t a result of Sanchez’ nonexistent defense (directly), but it was the result of another Yankees decision to eschew defense for… something. Andrew McCutchen’s arm is so weak that Mookie Betts went first to third on an Andrew Benintendi single to left in the 3rd inning. To… LEFT! One batter later, Martinez knocked Betts in with a fly ball… to left.


Severino’s high pitch count after three innings meant the Red Sox had seen a lot of pitches. And although they were at the bottom of the order, the Sox are smart hitters one through nine. Back-to-back walks in the 4th inning loaded the bases and then walked in a run to extend the Red Sox lead to three runs. Then the bats came alive. By the end of the inning, the game wasn’t actually over - the Yankees could have possibly comeback from a nine-run deficit - but it was psychologically over - the Yankees would respond with only one run. The Sox would score seven more runs, the last two off Romine in the 9th - when Brock Holt completed his historic cycle, a cycle he probably wouldn’t have had if Romine had started behind the plate. The Sox would also walk only one batter. They would also steal two bases. The Yankees would steal none.


Say what you want about the Sox bats heating up either way or Severino failing to deliver because he warmed up late. Starting pitchers don’t set the tone alone; starting batteries set the tone. And catchers usually define and redefine that tone throughout the game. Vazquez was a rock. Sanchez was sand.


Now that we’ve considered how a bad catcher can lose a game, consider how a good catcher can win one.


Game 4.


The Red Sox got to CC Sabathia early, and he and Sanchez helped them out with two walks (one to Vazquez) and a hit by pitch. 3-0. Then Vazquez homered against Yankee reliever Zach Britton. 4-0.


The Yankees manufactured a run (yeah, I said the Bronx Bombers MANUFACTURED a run) in the 5th and then were shut down by Vazquez and three different relievers until the 9th.


And now, not when Vazquez hit what would ultimately be the game winning homer in the fourth, but now - in the bottom of the 9th with the game on the line - is when Cora or whoever is pulling the Sox’ front-office strings wins the game and Boone or his possible Yankee puppeteers lose it.


Yankee relievers have shut the Red Sox out for five innings, and Red Sox relievers have returned the favor for three. Now Craig Kimbrel is on to close it out. Kimbrel - who everyone considered the surest thing on the Sox staff. The only question was always - how will the Sox bullpen bridge to Kimbrel?


This is why we play the games.


The bridge had been solid, but now the invincible Kimbrel is on the mound But Kimbrel has… the yips. Or, at least, horrible command of his curveball. Kimbrel walks two and hits a batter - in fact, he walks in a run. 4-2. Then Sanchez comes to the plate with one away and the bases loaded. Finally, the Yankees’ gamble on bombs trumping catching is about to pay off. And Sanchez hits... a long… sacrifice fly to left. A groundout ends the game. Kimbrel survives the inning with one great pitch - a fastball that Vazquez can catch - and one awful pitch - a curveball that Vazquez can block. Vazquez - a rock in the storm - gets Kimbrel through his worst by calling great locations and giving Kimbrel the confidence to throw a horrible, horrible curveball. Final score: 4-3. Red Sox move on.


Maybe Sale won Game 1. Maybe JA Happ lost it. Maybe Gary Sanchez won Game 2. Maybe David Price lost it. Maybe Nathan Eovaldi (who is filthy) won Game 3. Maybe Gary Sanchez lost it. But one thing is for sure - Christian Vazquez won Game 4.


Catching matters. If I were the Yankees, I’d trade for Tucker Barnhart. If I were the Sox, I’d watch out for the Astros’ Martin Maldonado. He’s a cut above Vazquez and Leon. And that’s why the Astros’ brass was wise to acquire him this season.


World Series aren’t won in October. They are won by attention to every detail and an appreciation for every facet of building a complete team - at the deadline, in the draft, the whole year.


Now, instead of asking who the starting pitchers are for the next game, maybe we should be looking at who the catchers are. Well, to be fair, maybe we should be asking, Who’s the battery today?


Verlander-Maldonado @ Sale-Vazquez - This Saturday… on TBS.