FanPost

2011 Outlook: J.D. Drew

2011 Outlook: J.D. Drew

(All stats from FanGraphs)

Lost in the flood of injury reports from 2010’s ravaged Red Sox roster was a difficult season for everyone’s favorite polarizing right fielder, J.D. Drew. After two straight extremely productive years in 2008-09, where he put up .400 and .389 wOBA’s while averaging 4.4 WAR a year, Drew slumped to a .346 wOBA in 2010. While his fielding remained solid, (+3.8 UZR) two factors seem most responsible for his decreased production at the plate, and thus most relevant to projecting his 2011 performance.

First and most glaringly, were his problems against lefthanded pitching. While David Ortiz’s troubles against lefties drew the lion’s share of attention, Drew also struggled tremendously against LHP in 2010, managing only a .208/.302/.309 triple-slash, striking out nearly 30% of the time, and posting an abysmal 19% infield fly-ball rate. A .262 BABIP didn't help matters either. In simpler terms, he was a near automatic out. This was the primary culprit dragging down his total line, as he otherwise maintained excellent production (.875 OPS) and power (.240 ISO) against RHP. While he had posted strong platoon splits against LHP the previous two years, I am inclined to attribute this past performance to good luck. Drew put up an .870 OPS against LHP in 2009 with the help of a .352 BABIP and inflated HR/FB%, and a .926 OPS in 2008 with an astounding .383 BABIP. His career splits versus lefties (.780 OPS/.314 BABIP) seem a more realistic baseline from which to project his performance in this regard for 2011. Drew’s difficulties with plate approach, detailed below, undoubtedly further exacerbated whatever issues he was facing against lefthanders. While year-to-year platoon splits are difficult to predict by nature of SSS (2008 and 2009 being prime examples), it seems a fairly safe bet that regression to the mean, combined with a presumed reset of his plate discipline and approach, will enable him to manage something closer in line to his career line against lefties in 2011. If Drew can manage a .700+ OPS against lefties, I will be happy to take it.

The second, and more disconcerting, problem Drew faced was a significant drop in walk rate. Drew’s BB%, which had never been lower than 14.3% in his tenure with Boston, tumbled to 11.0% in 2010. Looking at his plate discipline indicators for possible clues to this trend, three figures stand out. From 2009 to 2010,

-O-Swing% shot from 15.4 to 20.6%, the highest figure of his time in Boston

-O-Contact% skyrocketed from 59.0 to 70.2%, by far a career high

-F-Strike% increased to 57.3%, also the highest figure in his Boston tenure.

To me, this information suggests that Drew’s 2010 issues were rooted in his plate approach more than erosion in physical skills. Those who watched Drew’s at-bats could tell you this far more simply. Drew allowed pitchers to put him in a first-strike hole at a high rate, then induce weak contact by getting him to chase outside the strike zone. Chasing those bad pitches in particular was a hallmark of 2010’s difficulties for him, as they often seemed, even to the casual observer, pitches that the 08-09 Drew would have laid off of. Fortunately, it is unlikely that Drew somehow decided to abruptly and permanently abandon such a major element of what has made him a successful hitter, and other indicators are optimistic that his plate discipline will return to former levels in 2011. Had Drew been getting overpowered and swinging through pitches due to slowing bat speed or any other such issue of physical decline, I would have expected his total K% to jump markedly and his other contact indicators to show decline; David Ortiz’s peripherals, for example, display this pattern glaringly from 2008-10. However, Drew’s 22.0 K% in 2010 was exactly in line with his career mark (21.9%) and actually lower than it was during his successful 2009. Total contact % and zone contact % likewise did not show appreciable decline. I am thus inclined to be optimistic that his walk rate will stabilize next year, and he will return to the good old J.D. that infuriates the Pink Hatters and delights the saber-nuts with that passionlessly high OBP.

The final variable to consider is age. Drew enters the last year of his contract in 2011, which will represent his age-35 season. Aging players are by nature unpredictable. Drew may very well return to form, rip off an .850-.900 OPS, and retire in style as he claims to be considering; he may very well collapse into a platoon-player shell of his former self. We have no way to know for certain, only information and trends with which to guess. Even in a worst-case collapse of his offensive skills, he should still provide strong defense, and I have a hard time believing that even a calcified Drew would be unable to significantly outhit and outslug some of the specimens the 2010 Red Sox were forced to throw into the outfield. The best-case scenario is that he rebounds and ends his tenure in Boston, possibly his career, with a vintage 4+ WAR season. My concern is trying to pin down where in the middle between those two extremes he is most likely to end up. Given the positive indicators outlined above, I am leaning towards a good outcome. We will all be better served if Drew is able to demonstrate one final time in 2011 why he is one of the most underrated Red Sox players in a long time.

Finally, for amusement’s sake, I decided to do a quick 5-3-2 weighing of Drew’s past three seasons for a decidedly unscientific projection of a possible 2011 line.

OBP/SLG/OPS: .368/.485/.855, .372 wOBA, 3.5 WAR.